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Justification of Justice: Intuitionism
Bobby Jindal
Modem political philosophers ranging from Robert Nozick to John Rawls
have attempted to discern the principles of justice that should guide societal
arrangements. This project is of vital importance since it informs society of its
obligations to its weakest and most vulnerable members. Yet, the question of
why one should be just is an intelligible one to ask and deserves some response.
This paper argues that the political-legal obligation to be just is derivative from
man's more general duty to be moral, a commitment grounded in intuitions
which are themselves based on transcendental values, i.e., values that exist apart
from a particular society.
Those political theories that lack a transcendental notion of morality lack
binding force; the theorist who persuades without asserting truth is helpless to
convince or judge those committed to different principles. Modem liberalism,
with its explicit commitment to neutrality, has nothing to say to individuals who
do not share its values; similarly, communitarianism, with its cultural relativism,
cannot critique an unjust society from the outside. Many liberals and
communitarians underpin principles of justice, which require an individual to
sacrifice his interests to secure the welfare of others, with that justification
available to convince one that his preference for vanilla ice cream is mistaken;
yet, justice, unlike ice cream, is not merely a matter of taste. Principles of
justice not based on objective moral principles are arbitrary at best and
prejudicial at worst, without binding authority or persuasive moral force.
Though Rawls claims the "conception ofjustice is a practical social task rather
1
than an epistemological or metaphysical problem," there must be some a priori,
non-subjective commitment to justice, as well as positive laws, that compels
individuals to sacrifice their self-interest.
Transcendental morality alone provides a substantial answer to
those-anarchists,narcissists, libertarians, individualists, racists, isolationists, and
others-who question the obligation to serve the common good, i.e., sacrifice
one's interests for others. Merely discerning the claims ofjustice is not enough;
these claims must be legitimized. The gap between "is" and "ought" reflects the
distance between factual claims and moral ones, between truth and motivation,
between description and obligation. Even if rationality informs man of political
obligations to his fellow citizens, only moral intuitions can motivate him to act
accordingly.
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I. THE DIVERSITY OF MORAL JUDGEMENTS
An obvious critique of intuitionism and any transcendental grounding of
justice is the diversity of societal arrangements. Tolerant neutrality offers the
state widespread support from individuals with differing conceptions of the good
and prevents society from condemning unpopular minorities; liberalism is right
to value and accommodate a diverse range of choices. Even beyond the obvious
answers that different applications of the same principles of justice may yield
different superficial results and that not every societal difference is relevant to
principles of justice, there remain substantive differences among particular
societies and individuals. Yet, intuitionism can also explain why the institutional
arrangements of various societies often differ from each other and from common

intuitions concerning justice in relevant ways, without sacrificing an objective
notion of morality, due to a combination of two reasons. First, there exist clear
ethical principles that are practicably beyond man's ability. Second, justice
involves infinite, inexact, or otherwise unknowable obligations.
There exist clear ethical principles that are practicablybeyond man's ability.
The number of sand granules in the world is finite, but cannot be determined by
a single man. Similarly, the dictates of ethics may be enumerable, but beyond
the ability of any society. Particular societies vary in their distance from the
ideal.
Plato attributes injustice to a failure of human will. He links justice in
society withjustness in the individual, and reasons thatjustice, the highest human
value which is also desired by all, is not achieved because some are unwilling
to sacrifice. Plato argues that man's common nature results in a common
purpose, i.e., using reason to govern appetite. Thus, "moderation and temperance," the suppression ofparticular desires, lead to true fulfillment, the happiness
that comes from being just,2 but are usually overridden by the competing
motivation to indulge oneself.
In contrast, Machiavelli agrees that there may be a tangible benefit to acting
unjustly, but also concedes the necessity and even the desirability of such
behavior.3 Both men agree that a society can know the demands ofjustice, but
may not be able to fulfill its requirements. Yet, past experience also suggests
that societies have been mistaken about the notion of justice and are not simply
trying harder and harder to achieve a difficult goal.
Justice involves infinite, inexact, or otherwise unknowable obligations. An
example of the first type of goal is to count the number of points in a given line
segment, and an example of the second is to calculate the depth ofone's feelings.
The first involves matters which are infinite, and thus beyond man's comprehension; man's imagination can only approach infinity without ever reaching it. If

2. Plato, The Republic 14-15, 41-48, 130, 133-37 (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scott
trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1985).
3. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince 56-57 (Daniel Donno trans., Bantam Books 1981).
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man cannot even comprehend infinite ideals, it is no surprise that he is unable

to actualize them, excepting perhaps the miracle of birth that creates a being of

infinite value and those instances of sacramental grace within certain religious
faiths. Justice involving infinite obligations serves, at best, as an asymptote
towards which society aims, but may never reach.
The second case of inexact measurements involves the lack of precision
inherent to certain objects; beauty, art, passion, and other intangibles simply
cannot be quantified. Justice may be an abstract concept that does not lend itself
to measurement. Thus, it may unintelligible to consider the absolutejustness of
a given society. For example, an individual cannot declare that he likes
chocolate chip cookies with ten units, but rather only that he likes cookies better
than frog legs. Similarly, justice may be measurable only in ordinal units, rather
than cardinal ones; yet, this is not equivalent to reducing justice to a subjective
taste. An incommensurable notion ofjustice would allow societies to compare
themselves with others, but not to an absolute standard; thus, no society could
ever claim to be perfectly just.
Intuitionism accepts both types of limitations on man's ability to be just;
intuitions are neither perfect insights nor motivators. Man possesses an
incomplete view ofjustice, which he fails to fulfill. Man's inability to live justly
may represent a fundamental flaw, or perhaps reflects nothing more thin a lack
of will, but his capacity to know at least some part of the dictates of justice
offers hope. With the knowledge of what is required of him, man can aspire to
rise above his current situation and order both societal institutions and his daily
habits according to objective ethical principles.
Man must look within himself to discover those transcendentalprinciples of
justice which liberate him from his selfish and destructive desires. Though man
is flawed, and perhaps unable to achieve a perfect state of justness, the failure
4
of his will does not, despite Augustine's contention, condemn his reason. Man
can approximate the requirements of ethical behavior by studying the potential
contained in his nature; though the extent of actualization of each individual's
inherent nature differs widely, all humans share a common nature that leads to
a common purpose. This telos, man's ultimate and unchosen purpose, is what
allows him to rise above his current unjust state.
Man's gradual understanding of his own nature and purpose is a difficult
process that utilizes humanity's collective experience. As a child pieces together
a jigsaw puzzle, society must put together clues until it has the entire set of
obligations of justice. Some pieces may appear to fit at first, but later turn out
to be in a mistaken place; it may even be necessary to tear apart entire sections
built on one faulty piece. Thus, it may be necessary to destroy seemingly
beautiful pictures in order to construct the one true picture, and no pieces must
be left out or altered for an artificial fit. As society spends more and more time
on the puzzle ofjustice and accumulates more clues, the picture should become

4. Augustine, The City of God 568,852 (Henry Bettenson trans., Harmondsworth 1984).
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clearer and clearer until a discernible shape, a concrete goal, begins to form. It
is no wonder that man can imagine Utopia, the ideal state ordered by the
principles ofjustice; he has based the image on the clues made available to him.
II. NECESSITY

OF MORAL INTUITIONS

The nobility of social reform is predicated on man's ability to discern the
ethical principles on which a just society should be ordered. Though no
particular society possesses a complete conception ofjustice, all individuals have
some capacity, e.g., moral intuitions, to recognize the foundational principles.
Intuitionism's notion of ethical claims as intelligible to humanity is not
universallyheld and must, therefore, be defende against competing philosophical
perspectives.
There are two distinct approaches to ethical claims. The first,cognitivism,
acknowledges that ethical claims are discernible and have truth value.
Cognitivist arguments are either natural, claiming ethical judgements are
disguised assertions of fact and can be justified empirically, or non-natural,
denying that ethical claims are derived from empirical propositions.' Naturalism, either subjective or objective, provides some appeal and approaches the
explanatory and moral power of intuitionism, but reduces the force of morality
and does not properly differentiate it from scientific claims. While empirical
evidence may provide circumstantial justification for principles of morality, e.g.,
witness the sociological pathology which often accompanies the cultural
abandonment of certain moral values, the power and truth ofmoral principles are
not entirely described by the natural data. Non-naturalism can be divided into
either intuitionism or religious revelation.
The second approach to ethical claims, non-cognitivism, denies that ethical
claims have truth value. Non-cognitivism can further be subdivided into either
emotivism, which does not claim any justification or factuality for ethical claims,
or prescriptivism, which claims existential justification, but no other reason, for
believing ethical judgements." Non-cognitivism is obviously unsatisfying
because it does not provide any basis for formulating principles of justice to
order a society. Emotivism enslaves morality to the passions of the individual,
and prescriptivism merely claims moral force, without justification, for its claims.
Thus, man's knowledge ofjustice must rely on a cognitivist approach to ethics.
Of the two cognitivist approaches, only non-naturalism combines the truth
value of ethical claims with their seemingly extraordinary motivating force. The
crucial distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism lies in their answer to
the question ofupon what does morality supervene. While naturalism claims that
morality superveneson naturalproperties, non-naturalism replies with non-natural

5. Louis Pojman, The Fact/Value Problem, in Ethical Theory 357 ( Louis P. Pojman ed.,
Wadsworth Publishing Company 1989).
6. Id.
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properties. For example, Bentham and other utilitarians, objective naturalists,
claim that morality depends on people's happiness; conversely, Moore, a nonnaturalist, links morality with elusive non-natural properties. Thus, Bentham
claims that two actions are morally identical if they produce the same happiness,
and that the morality of a particular action changes only if the satisfaction it
produces changes. In contrast, revelationists, as an example of non-naturalists,
claim that two actions are morally identical if they are similarly approved by
God, and that the morality of a particular action can only change if God's will
changes.
Whereas naturalism reduces morality to an empirical collection of data, thus
rendering moral dilemmas nonsensical, non-naturalism elevates morality to a
plane that transcends happiness and other natural phenomena. Principles of
justice, which frustrate individual desires in the service of man's inherent nature
and the security of the rights of others, require the binding force of nonnaturalism to properly defend an objective notion of human well-being.
Naturalism reduces human dignity to considerations of material flourishing,
ignoring man's spiritual welfare, and cannot adequately protect human life from
competing goods. Life must be respected because of its inherent and transcendental value, not because it happens to coincide with some natural phenomena,
e.g., happiness, which is taken as a measure of success. Non-naturalism is
preferable to naturalism in that it provides for morality's force, its trump over
competing natural considerations.
Accepting intuitionism as the appropriate form of non-naturalism is not
meant as a rejection of religious revelation. It may be that intuitions themselves
are a form of religious revelation or that an intuition will point one to religious
beliefs. However, intuitions, which transmit information to an individual through
extra-sensory means, must precede revelation, or any other data interpreted by
the senses, in order to supply criteria by which to accept or reject a particular
revelation. It is through his intuitions that man trusts his senses, ability to
reason, religious revelations, etc.
For example, Abraham is commanded by God to sacrifice his son, the very
son that is the sign of God's covenant with him and is to produce countless
descendants.7 Abraham's attempt to obey the command indicates that he
believes the voice he hears comes from the ultimate Creator of all and Author
of morality; such beliefmust be predicated on an intuition. The revelation itself,
whether it be voices or other mystical experience, cannot be both its own
verification and also the object ofverification; some prior intuition, perhaps one
directing Abraham towards faith and acceptance of divine voices, is strong
enough to motivate Abraham to override the dictates of his conscience and
society's morality. This is not to say that intuitions are inevitably followed, for
Abraham maintains his free will and could spare his son. However, the intuition
must have existed before the revelation to account for Abraham's ability to

7. Genesis 15:1-21, 22:1-14.
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accept or reject the revelation. Thus, intuitionism, a cognitive non-natural
approach to ethical claims, provides the foundation for principles of justice.
It may be possible to combine the best aspects of objective cognitive
naturalism with intuitionism. That is, though intuitions serve as the primary
means for man to discern fundamental moral truths, human nature also testifies
to the existence of objective moral truths. Thus, non-natural properties, e.g.,
intuitions, provide the justification for ethical conclusions, but also coincide with
and are reinforced by the clues provided by natural properties, e.g., human
nature." For example, the intuition to avoid causing unnecessary pain coincides
with man's tendency for self-preservation; the intuition to choose a mate
coincides with man's biological need for a partner to reproduce and nurture; etc.
Thus, natural properties coincide with ethical claims, but non-natural intuitions
give ethical claims their moral force.
The moral force of intuitions is not accepted by all political theorists as
necessary for deriving binding principles of justice. For example, Ronald
Dworkin discusses how individuals relate moral theory and intuition without
admitting transcendental value for either. Though his alternative explanation
strips ethical principles of their binding moral force, Dworkin views his
avoidance of controversial truth claims, i.e., liberal neutrality, as an argument in
favor of his notion.
Without explicitlypositing coherenceas an objective requirement ofpolitical
morality, Dworkin claims that coherence requires a theory of justice to fit
people's intuitions about justice and allows intuitions to be amended to "make
the fit more secure." The two models consistent with this coherence are
"natural" and "constructive." While the natural model involves an objective
moral reality that is to be discovered and not created, the constructive model
does not depend on the objectivity of moral convictions for its moral force.
Unlike the natural model, which values consistency with convictions due to their
accuracy, it values consistency for the sake of predictability in the actions of
public officials.9
Expounding on the idea of coherence, Dworkin cites Rawls' "reflective
equilibrium" as a description of how individuals balance their convictions with
principles, with each side influencing the other. Dworkin jumps from this
description to the conclusion that the need to adjust convictions and principles
argues for accepting a "constructive model" of morality. However, Dworkin
does not apply his neutrality, but rather relies on an objective conception of
morality. For example, though Dworkin is adamant that no group has any claim
to truth, he allows an individual to judge and even disregard another's
intuitions.' ° The inconsistency of this view is apparent when one imagines
judging the convictions of another without any recourse to objective criteria.

8. Pope John Paul II, The Vatican on Veritatis Splendor, 4 This Rock 16 (1993).
9. Ronald Dworkin, The OriginalPosition,in Reading Rawls 51 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975).
10. Id. at 22, 33-36.
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The primary arguments for abiding by principles established by society
without any claim to truth are either consistency or functionalism. The first,
chosen by Dworkin, states that one must be true to principles for the sake of
consistency." However, this argument for consistency for its own sake, and not
for the principles or intuitions being followed, is incomplete. Intuitions, which
justify principles, must be consistent with something externalto themselves; else,
one is trapped in a vicious cycle whereby intuitions are overridden by principles
held only because of other intuitions. Without an independent reason to accord
varying degrees of legitimacy to particular intuitions, principles can only be a
best fit of intuitions and are limited to the extent that they cannot accommodate
all intuitions. Intuitions which do not fit principles, outliers, have more validity
than the principles according to the constructive model. The intuitions, and not
the principles, provide the moral legitimacy in this type of theory, but lack any
legitimacy themselves because they are not grounded in objective truth claims.
Dworkin's underlying "assumption that men and women have a responsibility to
fit the particular judgements on which they act into a coherent program of
action ' cannot stand without a claim to the objective value and truth of both
consistency and moral intuitions.
The second argument, functionalism, claims allegiance for society's
principles on utilitarian grounds. Moral intuitions are taken as neutral preferences, similar in substance to an individual's dislike for vanilla, and societal
principles follow these intuitions out of convenience. Thus, intuitions are
inexplicable background data that must be accommodated, but not given any
ethical force, in designing society's principles. Morality is the product of
unguided evolution, which selects those principles that accommodate general
intuitions with the least amount of contradictions. Contradicting people's
preferences would generate unnecessary frustration and is thus not an efficient
way to structure society. Yet, principles created by society's practical needs,
lacking independent value and moral force, cannot motivate an individual to
sacrifice wealth and opportunities for the sake of another. Enlightened
individuals should be enabled to free themselves and their societies from the
burden of these neutral preferences; yet, enlightenment involves caring for the
weakest members of society, not abandoning them.
Though Dworkin does not illustrate the viability of ethical principles without
the moral force provided by an objective morality discernible through intuitions,
his and others' preference for neutrality illustrates the need to justify intuitionism. But as neither consistency nor utilitarian arguments justify society's
accommodation of intuitions that lack a transcendental basis, a defense of
intuitions as non-natural properties must be provided. The following section
discusses those characteristics that distinguish intuitions from other motivations,
e.g., arbitrary likes and dislikes usually dismissed as whims.

11.

Id. at 36.
12. Id. at 28.
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M. INTUITIONS, FREE WILL, AND MORALITY
Intuitionim posits non-natural cognitivist principles of morality that
normally, but not always or necessarily, coincide with man's natural interests.
Man's objective nature delimits individual differences and results in universal
interests, the most basic being those things necessary for life itself. As
significant as interpersonal differences may appear, those characteristics common
to all people are even more noteworthy. The common nature of humanity thus
provides a rough criterion by which to judge moral codes; the validity of
principles can be approximated by evaluating their promotion of human wellbeing. 3 Such a view is predicated on the Aristotelian view that every object,
including a person, has an objective nature with an inherent end "towards which
it tends." Thus, the common human nature validates objective morals. 4
Western society has until recently held fast to this belief in absolute values and
unchanging first principles. 5
Intuitionism does not base the validity or content of moral principles solely
on human flourishing, as a naturalist approach to morality might, but rather
acknowledges the practicalutility ofapproximating moral principles by observing
objective human interests. This "shortcut" is especially relevant given the lack
of consensus on non-naturalist justifications. While individuals might be
encouraged to continue exploring the deeper non-natural basis for morality,
political consensus in pluralistic societies only requires the approximation
provided by the study of objective human flourishing. Once man's well-being
is accepted as a basis of an objective moral code, the challenge is to discern the
best means to facilitate human flourishing; herein is the necessity of intuitions
as unique insights into notions of well-being and justice.

IV. INTUITIONS AS INSIGHTS AND MOTIVATORS
Just as physiology and evolutionarybiology teach that form follows function,
it should be possible to study human nature, which specifies an objective notion
of well-being, as the function and derive the form, which is morality. This
objective perspective supposes that humanity is designed to abide by moral
codes, rather than moral codes being designed according to man's whims. Only
those human interests which are truly moral will be served by a moral code, thus
excluding many interests acknowledged by man in everyday conversation. "It
is not because they produce happiness that ... activities are valuable; it is
because these activities are valuable in more direct and specific ways that they

13. Louis Pojman, A CritiqueofEthicalRelativism, in Ethical Theory 357 (Louis P. Pojman ed.,
Wadsworth Publishing Company 1989).
14. Arthur F. Holmes, Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions 62 (1984).
15. William Pfaff,Question His Prescription,Perhaps,but Respect the Pope'sDiagnosis,Int'l
Herald Trib., October 13, 1993, at 9.
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produce happiness."'" Merely observing what makes individuals happy and
then labeling these causes morally correct are not enough.
Though the coincidence of man's nature with objective moral principles
means that an ethical society will best facilitate human well-being, this objective
notion of well-being must not be confused with the happiness maximized by
utilitarianism. Utilitarians are correct to articulate the commonly held intuition
that morality must serve human interests, but mistakenly identify man's interests
with reference only to his preferences rather than a transcendental notion of the
good. Man's happiness is not always coincident with his best interests; indeed,
man may not always be aware of his interests, but is always aware of his
happiness. In its very lowest form, utilitarianism is enslaved to man's every
desire, whether an intolerant external preference for how others should be treated
or an intensely held extravagant desire for how one should be treated, and is no
better than hedonism. In contrast, a theory based on transcendental morality can
discern which preferences must be fulfilled and which can be rejected.
Intuitionism may override individual desires in order to promote objective human
flourishing and thus rejects subjective naturalism, i.e., claiming that the
individual's choices provide truth claims their meaning and justification.
Intuitionism's rejection of individual desires and happiness as justifications
for morality commits it to providing an alternative methodology to discern the
principles of justice. Rationality alone cannot guide man to morality, for the
belief in an ordered world accessible to reason is itself a particular pre-rational
moral belief. In contrast, Rawls is correct in basing the legitimacy of his
Original Position, and the principles it embodies, on its consistency with
generally held intuitions;" similarly, Plato's Socrates appeals to his readers'
intuitions about justice, Locke locates his notion of the state of nature in man's
innate ideas, and many other theorists also justify their conceptions of the good
according to man's intuitions. Intuitions, which by definition contain their own
justification, are an invaluable source of insights into morality.
Just as man determines the direction and force of wind by its effects, rather
than direct observations, intuitions provide visible confirmation of and data about
moral principles. Moral intuitions are clues into a natural order which frames
morality in the same way natural laws frame physical reality; such intuitions are
more than mere insights into moral facts, but are also potent, though not
necessarily overwhelming, motivating forces active in all. Preachers, political
activists, and others hoping to motivate their listeners often use the feelings of
guilt and shame which accompany any contradiction of strongly held moral
intuitions; thus, appeals to justice, fairness, mercy, and other moral intuitions are
often used in political debates and from the pulpit. On the other hand, feelings
of affirmation result from actions consistent with deeply held moral intuitions;
thus, charities seeking donors often remind individuals of the fulfillment that

16. Wolf, Susan, Moral Saints, 79 J. Phil 419, 429 (1982).
17. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 21-22 (1971).
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accompanies acts of generosity. The universal motivation to treat others fairly
or perform acts of altruism is not entirely socially constructed, but rather has its
origin in moral intuitions.
In addition to being intelligible to man, morality must also wield some, but
not always determining, power over his will. Though the full motivating force
of an intuition may often be evident, e.g., through guilt, after the intuition has
been contradicted, intuitions are also considered, though not necessarily followed,
when an individual contemplates a course of action. Man's intellect must
coincide with his desire, both formed in part by intuitions, in order for an ethical
conception of the good to be actualized. Such a view of intuitions as a
motivating force behind morality, commonly called "intemalism," is usually
associated with subjectivism. However, some set of intuitions must be
commonly applicable for society to use these intuitions as a guide in formulating
moral principles.
The instinctive aspect of morality, though contrary to the detached and
abstract nature usually associated with objective principles, renders moral codes
universal. The most basic foundational principles ofjustice, e.g., "inflicting pain
on a sentient being for no purpose is wrong," are instinctive and not learned.'
All human beings, regardless of their experiences, have a natural tendency
towards this basic rule. The universality of this principle is evidenced by
horrified reactions to violations. An illustration ofthis fact is that even in times
of war, a drastic period during which many rules of decent behavior are
suspended, outrage is still expressed over the killing of innocent civilians. The
moral outrage is an instinctive reaction and does not follow from logical
reasoning. People naturally feel an emotion motivated by an intuition that
compels them to condemn such killings.
Morality is not merely a matter of cognitive ability; even those without
formal education are expected to abide by basic unlearned moral principles.
Saintliness is not correlatedwith intelligence. Intuitions, availableto all, explain
the universal nature of morality. In contrast with universal intuitions, Plato
requires that individuals be virtuous before they recognize good; he excludes
atheists from his ideal state since it is the gods who command moral duties. 9
Rather than being limited to those who are virtuous, the postulated moral
intuitions provide all with a notion of the good.
The universality of intuitions does not mean that "cause no needless pain"
and other basic principles are always followed or even recognized. Moral
intuitions, like reason, are only one of many motivators and do not always
determine one's actions. It is not surprising that individuals act inconsistently
with respect to their moral intuitions, respecting them as sacrosanct in one
situation and freely violating them in another. However, the fact that individuals
feel compelled to justify actions which contradict particular moral principles,

18. Judith Thomson, The Realm of Rights 14 (1990).
19. Holmes, supranote 14, at 69-70.
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e.g., by appealing to other moral principles, is at least circumstantial proof of
their universal instinctive appeal. For example, military leaders on both sides of
armed conflicts portray their causes as "just wars," emphasize their nation's
objectives in honorable terms, and express remorse for the loss of human life.
Regardless of the persuasiveness of such arguments in particular situations, the
fact that individuals feel compelled to offer justifications testifies to their need
to overcome moral intuitions against causing pain and harming others.
The existence of competing motivators confirms both man's free will and his
responsibility for acting ethically. Merely doing what is right, that which is
prescribed by the moral law, is not the same as being virtuous, acting out of a
desire to obey the moral law; coincidentally doing the right thing, while
motivated by the wrong reasons, is not the same as acting ethically. Freedom,
the ability to choose between moral and non-moral motivators, is necessary to
give any act moral worth and actor moral responsibility.
Choosing to act ethically is a critical component of acting ethically. Merely
knowing the moral law is not the same as abiding by it. Indeed, hypocritical
moral sages may be "worse sinners" since their violation of moral laws cannot
hide behind ignorance or intentionality! Alternatively, other perspectives do not
allow this individual consciousness and thus dismiss selfless or other moral acts,
e.g., denying oneself advantage even if the chances of being noticed are nil, as
either externally imposed habit or self-delusion. Intuitionism predicts that moral
intuitions compete with other motivators for an individual's allegiance and may
often lose, but are always a force with which to be reckoned.
V. FAILuREs OF INTUITIONS AS MOTIVATORS

Given the obvious fact that many individuals and societies do not act
ethically, moral intuitions must be either limited in scope or potency. Intuitionism accepts both limitations without conceding any loss in the legitimacy of
objective morality. The inability of intuitions to override competing motivators,
e.g., appetites, is discussed in this section and helps explain the existence of
wrongdoers; the more fundamental limitation on intuitions, their inability to
provide all with a complete conception of the good, is discussed in the next
section.
Moral intuitions may fail to act as powerful motivators due to a variety of
factors external to the actor. For example, socialization may dull one's moral
instincts, even to the point that wrongdoers feel little remorse and seem
completely unaware of ethical codes. For example, youngsters growing up in
violent environments may accept the atrocities they witness daily as the norm;
it is no surprise that children of abusive parents often repeat their parents'
mistakes or that many children maturing in certain inner cities do not make longtermplans. Social workers in impoverished neighborhoods report the frustration
of observing many children engaging in unsafe behaviors, such as promiscuity,
drug abuse, and violence. Such children, whose actions seem irrational, are
unafraid of AIDS, teenage pregnancies, and other consequences of their actions
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since they do not expect to live beyond their twenties anyway. Their moral
intuitions, even the most basic instinct towards self-preservation, are muted,
though not obliterated, by the powerful societal forces surrounding and
occasionally overwhelming them.
Though most societal institutions are not radically opposed to moral
intuitions, no society's arrangements are perfectlyjust. All societies exert some
pressure contrary to the individual's moral intuitions. Following one's morals
often involves being counter-cultural, and most individuals are influencedby peer
pressure throughout their lives. Thus, it is not surprising that members of a
society internalize their cultural norms, even those held by few other societies,
and exhibit behavior patterns which reflect society's attitudes towards drug use,
extramarital sexuality, modem music, fashion trends, and other activities which
vary in their moral content. As a result, many immoral actions, e.g., altering
expense accounts, are common in practice, if not explicit acceptance.
The need for affirmation from one's peers canbe a very powerful motivating
force, often stronger than moral intuitions. Even the individual attempting to be
ethical may face difficult choices as the entire system may be against him; for
example, the honest businessman in a corrupt market faces the dilemma ofbeing
honest or paying bribes to avoid bankruptcy. This is not to say that morality
should be redefined to fit society better or that society has made it impossible for
an individual to act ethically, but rather that it is understandable why individuals
contradict their own intuitions rather than opposing the strong impulse to
conform to society's standards.
In addition to individuals acting according to societal preferences, rather than
abiding by objective moral principles, there are others who contradict societal and
moral codes to fulfill selfish appetites or perform brutal acts. However, just as
contrary societal preferences do not threaten objective moral principles, the
existence of immoral actors does not weaken the moral claim of intuitions. For
example, the limited appeal of sadism does not negate the moral principle that
"inflicting pain for selfish satisfaction is wrong." Individuals can commit wrong
deeds, but must first overcome their moral instincts, i.e., their consciences.
Individuals capable of the most despicable crimes can be responsive to spiritual
and other forms of rehabilitation and are often the products of abusive environments, thus evidencing an internal drive towards morality that can be developed
but which has been suppressedby externalcircumstancesand individual decisions.
An even more bizarre group overrides the instinctive drive for self-preservation, normally a powerful argument for the value of life and for universal
morality, to enjoy pain. Masochists, who do not condone the destruction of life
as this would interfere with their pleasure, have become partially numb to their
intuitions.2" However, masochism does not belie the powerful testimony to the

20. The claim that pain which causes pleasure isdistinct from other notions of pain, normally
associated with injury and the frustration of one's desires, is a semantic argument which strips the
term of its normal meaning. "Pain" is used to denote objective suffering.
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value of life evidenced by the instinct for survival present in both animal, e.g.,
the raccoon who chews off his limb to escape a trap, and man, who instinctively
moves his body out of harm's way. Human reflexes work to preserve life or
avoid injury, even against the individual's will, thus requiring one to forcibly
prevent one's eyelids from closing to administer eyedrops. The ability of
despondent suicidal individuals, masochists, etc. to overcome their intuitive desire
for self-preservation does not refute the existence and moral force of that
intuition; indeed, such individuals are properly recognized as sick and in need of
help. Man's alienation from his inherent nature is a deplorable state which
results in horrible atrocities, but does not threaten the objective moral principles
which coincide with his true nature.
The fact that particular cultures have encouraged or that some individuals
practice bigamy, slavery, self-mutilation, etc. does not threaten the legitimacy of
moral intuitions, based on transcendental morality, which condemn these actions.
Flawed societal and individual attitudes may be the result of overpowering
appetites, perversions of the good, conscious disregard for morality, etc. As few
societies or individuals explicitly admit the depravity of their choices, those
motivators which successfully compete with intuitions must masquerade as
conceptions of the good. Evil actions are often defended, perhaps sincerely, as
expressions ofmoral principles; thus, intuitions that fail as motivators often fail
as insights.
VI. FAiLUREs OF INTUITIONS AS INSIGHTS

The failure of intuitions to successfully and lucidly transmit moral truths to
humanity is evidenced by the fact that an individual's moral instincts are often
in conflict, change over time, and occasionally cannot be reconciled with those
of others'. Since an intuition cannot be simultaneously true and not true, these
various states mean that certain sincerely held intuitions are false. To be aware
of moral intuitions is to be motivated, at least in part, by them, but individuals
lack the ability to discern fully their own intuitions. The failure of intuitions to
provide complete and consistent insights into morality does not reflect their
flawed nature, but rather suggests that man's ability to discern moral intuitions
is in some sense faulty. Just as disabilities do not invalidate the concept of
health, faulty intuitions, which cause individuals to feel no remorse and prevent
them from comprehending the evilness of their actions, do not threaten normal
moral intuitions.
It is no wonder that intuitions are often misinterpreted and even ignored;
objective morality can be more subtle than many think. Indeed, even straightforward intentions are often lost in the application. For example, a volunteer
worker may mistakenly overfeed a starving child, causing medical complications;
though the intuition to help others is correct, the means chosen actually frustrate
the ultimate goal. Wanting to do the right thing is a good start, but is often not
enough.
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Consider the parable ofthe three blind men describing an elephant. Eachman
reports a different sense perception: one feels, another hears, and a third smells.
The three cannot even agree on one particular sense perception: each feels a
differentpart; eachhears a differentpart ofthe animal's vocal repertoire; and each
smells a different part. The point is that all are correct, and all are wrong. All
three men are sensing the same animal, but none has the complete picture. So it
is with objective morality, the elephant of ethics. Morality may be composed of
objective principles, but man often perceives only disjointed parts. Man is left
with only his imagination and his wits to reconstruct morality from the clues
provided by intuitions; hopefully, he will do better than the three blind men.
The failure of intuitions to serve as comprehensive and accurate moral
insights is due to an individual's inability or unwillingness to discern them.
Allowing intuitions to be fundamentally mistaken, not merely incomplete or
misinterpreted, invalidates all further principles and would require some
independent criteria to judge intuitions. As no such criteria exists, certain basic
intuitions must be accepted without questioning and then used to discern further
intuitions, principles, and truths. The sanctity of objective morality, despite
man's inability to comprehend fully the good, is illustrated by the court's habit
of showing leniency to those individuals unable to distinguish between right and
wrong, while still condemning their actions as criminal; thus, man's flawed
moral capacity affects his culpability, but not the objective moral status of his
actions.
Plato postulates that only certain individuals have the moral insights
necessary to rule and act justly.2 Calvin's view of fundamentally depraved
man often leads to the theology of predestination which claims only the "elect"
are imbued with special graces, though not all Calvinists agree on whether even
these individuals can rise above the state of both original and actual sin to act
ethically.' Intuitionism argues that though no individual may actualize his
potential and act upon his intuitions in a consistent manner, all individuals must
have the potential to discern intuitions; a complete absence of moral capacity
prevents an individual from being a moral agent.
Though all individuals occasionallyrmistake vice for virtue, those who would
consistently feel no guilt over abhorrent actions lack the moral faculties necessary
to be ethical or even fully human. Such an extreme state of depravity does not
include the vast majority of individuals who commit heinous acts, but later regret
their crimes. Also distinct are those who deliberately delude themselves or
simply do not understand the reality of their situations. What is left is the rare
individual who deliberately and with full knowledge commits evil acts and thinks
them morally justified.
The capacity to possess and discern moral intuitions, though never fully
realized, remains a constitutive aspect of the human condition. Whether

21. Plato, supra note 2, at 113.
22. James Akin, A tiptoe through TULIP, 4 This Rock 7-8 (1993).
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humanity's moral corruption is inborn or a product of environment or both is
akin to whether a physical disease is genetic or viral. Regardless of the cause,
all individuals occasionally misinterpret and confuse their intuitions, often to
serve their own perceived ends. Indeed, the failure of intuitions to act as
motivators may necessitate their misinterpretation to appease man's innate drive
towards moral behavior, thus creating a vicious cycle whereby unethical behavior
results in flawed intuitions. Thus, the failure of intuitions to serve as reliable
insights into morality is due partly to man's inability or unwillingness to
differentiate intuitions from rationalizations.
Though no one may everbe truly virtuous, i.e., actualize all moral intuitions,
and even though moral intuitions are accessibleto all, some individuals are better
than others at discerning and manipulating their intuitions. Just as some
scientists or philosophers are better than others at taking the same data and
deducing new paradigms, certain individuals have an increased capacity
compared to others in the realm of moral reasoning. Though all may develop
their innate capacitiesthrough discipline,' certain individuals possess a superior
innate vision; similarly, Picasso used the same paint and canvas used by many
lesser artists and created a new style ofpainting due to his superior creativity and
insight. Superior moral vision may be more of a burden than a talent, in that it
informs individuals of their moral obligations but is not necessarilyaccompanied
by the will necessary to actualize moral insights! While theologians and
philosophers often have insights into morality, it is the saints who actually live
according to that morality. Yet, there does appear to be a positive, though not
perfectly causal, relationship between following and discerning intuitions.
The fact that individuals possess varying degrees of moral reasoning skills
argues for a theory of justice to help guide society, but should not be abused as
an excuse for authoritarianism. Despite intuitionism's differentiation between
individuals according to moral perceptiveness, autonomy, i.e., the liberty to make
mistakes, is still regarded as an essential component of well-being; the powerful
inclination to respect individual judgement is reflected in the allowance for an
individual to follow his conscience. However, this right to conscience does not
free the individual from the obligation to consider established moral codes or
protect the rebel from the consequences of rejecting these codes. Intuitionism
admits the right of the individual, regardless of the justness of his cause, to abide
by his intuitions, as long as he does not expect society to abandon its commitment to its ethical principles; thus, both the rebel and the society which punishes
him may be acting correctly. It is through such challenging that man's
understanding of morality evolves. Obviously, a society must reevaluate its
principles if they continually conflict with the intuitions of its members, and
members must do likewise.
Perhaps more common, and more complicated, than the conflict between
individual and societal morality is the conflict between particular intuitions,

23. Pope John Paul 11, Veritatis Splendor 94-98 (1993).
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which seemingly forces the individual to choose one over the other. However,
if intuitions fit together to form a coherent objective morality, they cannot
contradict each other, and any conflict must be due to an imprecise, incomplete,
or otherwise faulty understanding of one or both intuitions. Assuming that the
conflict is not between intuition and appetite, or some other desire disguised as
intuition, many conflicts between intuitions canbe reduced to disagreements over
implementation.
Take the case of a primitive farmer desiring food. While an international
aid agency offers to increase the efficiency of his farm through the eventual
fruits of fertilizer and machinery, he does not see the benefit of cow dung and
steel. However, there is only the appearance of conflict between the desires of
the farmer and the goals of the agency. The agency could be frustrated and
paralyzed by inaction if it attempts to choose between respecting the farmer's
stated desires and fulfilling his objective needs. However, providing farming
aids and training best fulfills the shared intuition of the farmer and agency that
all individuals should have sustenance. Though not all intuitions can be so
readily reconciled, this conflict illustrates the coherence of many intuitions in
apparent tension.
In summary, intuitions are hardly straightforward motivators or simple
insights into objective morality; though they serve both purposes, man's
competing appetites and his inability to fully discern moral intuitions result in
unethical behavior. Such a view of moral intuitions is consistent with the
Augustinian view of man's inherently fallen nature, not with the secular
humanist's idealized view of the condition of mankind. Yet, intuitionism's
conclusions may appeal to both those who acknowledge a higher authority as the
source of intuitions as well as those who accept intuitionism only insofar as it
describes moral principles consistent with man's objective well-being. The
perspective which depends entirely on man to construct morality cannot rise
higher than his flawed understanding. There can be no appeal to established
truths or principles, only recourse to intuitions. But intuitionism's transcendental
view of the good allows man to adjudicate among particular intuitions.
Additionally, the fact that individuals are likely to misinterpret or misapply moral
intuitions underscores the necessity of formulating principles of justice.
VII. NECESSITY OF INTUITIONS AS OBJECTIVE INSIGHTS

Man's inability to act on and discern intuitions, though responsible for
preventing him from being consistently ethical, does not mitigate the link
between intuitions and objective morality. In contrast with Dworkin's
ambivalence about the truth of intuitions, intuitionism explicitly recognizes their
transcendental nature as necessary to provide content for and justify principles
of justice which are strong enough to supersede man's selfish interests and
competing appetites. Though liberals claim neutrality for their assertions,
invoking a minimalist approach to political morality in an attempt to avoid
controversy, a fuller conception of the good is required in order to conflict with

1999]

BOBBY JINDAL

and override other motivators. The very content which Rawls and Dworkin
avoid claiming for their theories provides principles ofjustice with their moral
force.
Principles of justice which are entirely dependent on people's consent
present no arguments against the status quo; if morality's legitimacy is derived
solely from individual preferences, then these same individuals' actions must be
just and therefore need no correction or guidance from binding principles.
Individuals, according to this idealized account, would work without incentives
to produce enough for all in society and then willingly sacrifice their property
rights; thus, there would be no danger of free riders, unproductivity, or other
issues generally confronted by distributive principles ofjustice. Yet, principles
of justice are required exactly because people are not automatically just; such
principles must have legitimacy external to the actor if they are to constrain
him. 24 Due to man's selfish desires, true principles of justice should appear
difficult, challenging man's rationalizations of his appetites, rather than merely
the product of his preferences; moral codes must, on occasion, make individuals
feel constrained and involve sacrifice if they are to do any work.
Dworkin's move of taking an individual's concern for himself and applying
it to others assumes the very equality he is attempting to achieve; similarly,
Rawls derives his principles ofjustice from those deep bases of agreement which
already exist within society, i.e., those moral convictions common to all.'
However, just distributions are not the.inevitable product ofpeople's preferences;
an individual could reasonably question why the fact that he desires to be treated
with dignity requires that he treat others similarly. Though both men recognize
the need to override selfish desires, and thus appeal to people's preferences as
expressed when abstracted from their particular situations, they do not justify
either this interpretation of equality or their specific conclusions from this mental
exercise.
Intuitionism, though close in methodology to Rawls's model, differs because
it depends upon objective principles which are discerned through and may
override immediate intuitions, rather than empirical claims about people's actual
Intuitionism examines humanity's collective
or abstracted preferences.
experience for common moral intuitions, but, unlike Rawls, does not confer
legitimacy upon principles of justice because of political consensus. History
teaches that the state, church, and other social institutions often act to restrain
individual selfishness and promote a just social order. Similarly, individuals,
e.g., Martin Luther King, Gandhi, George Washington, etc., must also at times
intervene to reorder their social institutions.

24. Imagine trying to prevent society from enslaving a portion ofits population to enrich the vast
majority without resort to supra-societal arguments concerning human rights and dignity.
Majoritarian consent may be achievable if membership in the enslaved group is dependent on some

fixed characteristic which cannot be transmitted to the general population. The transcendental notion
of human dignity, not self-interest, is the most powerful argument against such arrangements.
25. Rawls, supranote 1, at 226-29.
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Individuals strive towards the ideal goal of ethical behavior, the motivation
coming from internal intuitions and reinforced by external structures, but often

fall short and thus require society to intervene to protect the basic rights of
others. It is only by comparing individual actions to some higher standard that
one can argue for redistribution and restraint in the name of justice. Rights,
whose existence is communicated to man through his moral intuitions, serve
man's objective interests, but are not created by man nor are they dependent on
his recognition for their continued existence;26 any lesser definition would
render them useless as principles to guide society to be better and to motivate
individuals to sacrifice for others.
Dworkin hints at a higher source for morality's power when he claims that
"principles must have independent appeal to our moral sense,"27 but does not
follow through with the significance of this statement. In contrast, intuitionism
recognizes both the power of intuitions to provide clues about an objective
morality and also their shortcomings as insights and motivators. Intuitions,
limited by man's understanding, serve an essential purpose as distorted
reflections, if not exact images, of objective moral principles.28
VIII. USING INTUITIONS TO DISCERN OBJECTIE MORALITY

Excepting divine revelation, individuals are left with their moral intuitions
and reasoning skills to discern principles ofjustice. Though man's inability to
discern perfectly intuitions renders their interpretation flawed, they are not
useless. For example, some intuitions, e.g., "cause no pain," are more certain
than others. The existence of objective truths allows man to learn to discern
intuitions from experience and build on intuitions and moral codes from other
time periods and cultures. Though the application of intuitions may vary,
depending on particular customs and traits, the underlying doctrines remain the
same and can be abstracted. 9 The convergence of independently held intuitions
suggests the discovery, not creation, of an objective truth, in contrast with
relativism's emphasis on and inability to transcend the material world.30
Moral knowledge, like scientific knowledge, can evolve to lead to better
understanding. There is no need for every generation to deduce for itself the
dictum cause no pain, just as every generation of mathematicians does not
discover anew the basic postulates of geometry. It is enough to understand and
internalize the work of others and build upon their foundations, though there is
value in periodically questioning their assumptions and reestablishing initial
beliefs. Certain intuitions, due to their basic nature or repeated occurrence in
other times and cultures, may gain credibility. Man must combine established
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Pope John Paul II, supra note 8, at 17.
Dworkin, supranote 9, at 23.
Plato, supra note 2, at 209-12.
Pope John Paul II, supranote 23, at 83-85.
Plato, supra note 2, at 209-12.
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contemporary
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X. PROCESS OF LEARNING MORAL FACTS

Man's obligation to follow his most fundamental intuitions, the dictates of
his conscience, even if they contradict general principles, does not mean he may
follow his every whim and ascribe it to intuitions. Indeed, man may examine his
experience with flawed intuitions and decide that his most basic intuition is to
trust an external authority or shape his conscience according to the principles of
that authority. Consciences, like habits, may be shaped through will, and the
ethical individual will take great effort to shape his conscience, crucial in
discerning and acting on intuitions, according to some trusted authority or set of
principles. Good consciences, like good habits, involve preparation before a
situation arises; else, it is often too late.
An essential step in man's gradual understanding of morality is the guidance
basic intuitions provide in accepting and rejecting othersupposed intuitions. One
might discern a directive to trust a particular authority, e.g., magisterium, or
certain principles, e.g., human dignity, which then lead to other specific
guidelines. Reason, even guided by the content of moral intuitions, is not up to
3
the task of resolving many ethical dilemmas. ' Thus, secondary principles are
accepted on the authority of a primary authority that is accepted due to basic
intuitions. Examples of primary authorities include Scripture for various
religious groups, ecclesiastical hierarchy for certain churches, common law for
many societies, the laws of reason and empiricism for scientists, etc. Such
primary institutions or principles act authoritatively only within the sphere
delimited by the same moral intuitions that give them their power. For example,
the Catholic Church properly legislates on matters of faith and morals, e.g.,
prohibiting murder, but improperly used its authority to judge Galileo's
teachings; though Catholicism gives the papacy primacy in moral matters, it does
not subject scientific judgement to ecclesiastical authority.
Whereas intuitions provide information about basic principles, e.g., the rules
of scientific evidence, they are less useful in discerning specific conclusions, e.g.,
the structure of DNA. Moral intuitions legitimize authoritative principles or
institutions, but do not provide infallible guidance concerning the precise details
of a just society. The inevitable conflict between individual intuitions, whether
held by the same person or by different people, demands some process for
resolution. Deriving specific policies involves either unanimity with respect to
intuitions concerning the common good or an authority with the power to
override individual intuitions.32

31. Pope John Paul I, supranote 8, at 15.
32. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 232 (1988).
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Since the imprecise nature of intuitions prevents unanimity on particular
aspects of the common good, some commonly respected authority, whether
vested in principles or institutions, must, ofnecessity, be trusted. However, even
though consent may be more easily achieved with respect to sources of authority
than with concerning specific notions of the common good, authority must not
be held hostage to absolute certainty within the individual or the group. 3
Ultimately, some authority is and indeed must be accepted as a means to further
the common good; the only external criterion to assess authority is a conception
of the common good provided by one's moral intuitions. Perhaps the most basic
moral intuition, that man should treat his intuitions with skepticism though they
provide the best insights into objective morality, leads one to accept authority on
faith; though one is more confident in the veracity of the authority's legitimacy,
as it represents a basic intuition, than in any competing claim, one can never be
absolutely sure. At least, trusting in an authority abstracted from the particulars
of one's situation insures that one is not acting due to self-interest or prejudice
alone.
The most obvious example of a commonly accepted authoritative principle
is the process of majority rule, which involves giving authority to the preferences
of others in society. Such authority is hardly absolute, since the majority can be
wrong. The fact that individuals are motivated out of self-interest and often deny
their own moral intuitions prevents one from always allowing majority rule to
override one's intuitions; the historical record, e.g., Nazi Germany, American
slave trade, Indian caste system, etc., argues against acceding all moral
judgements to the state. Though one may trust the state on a daily basis, due to
practicality and a sincere belief in the political process, one should withhold the
right to override any authority if it conflicts with one's most fundamental
intuitions. Basic principles, e.g., human dignity, have more claim to allegiance
than political institutions, though the latter should always strive to effectively
implement the former.
The same skepticism which prevents one from placing absolute confidence
in the political judgements of others should also prevent one from trusting one's
own moral intuitions absolutely; the human capacity for self-delusion and
rationalizationknows few, ifany, limits. Meaningful principles of morality must
not be subject to individual whims; there must be some external authority which
provides justification for believing or acting a certain way though one does not
immediately see a sufficient reason for doing so.34 For example, the claim that
one trusts God's revelation more than one's own reasoning may evidence a trust
in authority, discerned by one's primary moral intuitions; similarly, a communist
may express the same loyalty and confidence in the virtue of the state. Primary
moral intuitions lead one to accept authority; this derivative authority may
override secondary intuitions, even when the individual is strongly attached to

33. Id. at 251-52.
34. Id. at 233.
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those intuitions, but its validity is contingent upon its continued consistency with

basic moral beliefs.
This procedure of trusting primary intuitions to judge secondary ones is
similar to Rawls's use of commonly held convictions to judge the outcomes of
his Original Position and his subsequent use of the Original Position to provide
guidance in confronting difficult questions of distribution. The significant
difference is that intuitionism expects intuitions to lead to a direct acceptance of
the subsequent authority, rather than the mere observation that the initial
consequences of both the intuitions and the derivative authority are similar.
Intuitionism's derivative authority is accorded greater legitimacy than Rawls's
contingently held Original Position, which only models intuitions and may be
modified to fit better the specific principles it produces. Thus, authoritative
principles have more validity than any individual intuition, though an accumulation of contradicting intuitions would argue for at least a reexamination, if not
eventual abandonment, of all but the most basic principles.
The modification of principles does not mean that the same action can
change from being right to wrong or wrong to right, but rather that either
changes in society have rendered the situation different in morally significant
ways or that society was mistaken in the first place. An example of the former
would be new medical technology which allows physicians to detect sickle-cell
anemia or sex phenotype in fetuses, thus creating the dilemmas of whether
genetic manipulation or abortion is justified in cases of genetic defect or gender
preference. Society's previous silence on such cases should not be interpreted
as approval, but rather reflected its inability to extract information from amniotic
fluid. An example of society recognizing that it is mistaken is America's repeal
of slavery laws and affirmation of the equality of all persons. It is not that
blacks suddenly became equal in the nineteenth century, but rather that America
was wrong to enslave part of its population. Thus, situations are objectively
right or wrong, and it is man's fallible understanding of intuitions and resulting
principles which changes.
The possibility of error does not excuse those individuals who follow
random and seemingly inconsistent intuitions without any regard for coherence
or principles. Individuals have a moral obligation to inform themselves,
deliberate over the relevant facts, act according to their consciences, and then be
willing to accept the consequences. Society's obligation is to provide stability
and be more conservative, implementing changes when needed but not mistaking
progress as change for the sake of change. Individuals have more right to alter
their principles than to reorder society's morality. Society must reflect the
collective experience of all individuals and thus requires cumulative evidence of
irreconcilable conflict before abandoning previously held principles.
The fact that a particular principle has been held for a period of time
testifies both to the fact that it has been adopted based on common intuitions and
also that it has not produced enough conflict with subsequent generations to be
overthrown. The individual may decide to submit his individual intuitions to the
authority of an established principle due to his past failure at discernment;
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indeed, moral principles have no weight or purpose unless an individual is
willing to sacrifice to serve his commitment to them. Principles provide
guidance to individuals too unsure of themselves to decide in the midst of
temptation, i.e., the specifics of a situation, and also provide starting premises
from which to deduce conclusions concerning new dilemmas; however, principles
will never be formed or changed if individuals are not willing to challenge them
with the moral power of intuitions. Thus, the power of inertia protects traditions
to a certain extent, but does not provide absolute immunity.
This process of basing principles on the raw data of intuitions and then
refining the principles to accommodate new observations is similar to the way
the human brain interprets reality. The brain matches "its model of reality to
signals from the body's sensors" and thus interprets what "must be happening."
For example, a passenger sitting in a stationary train as a parallel one starts
moving forward feels, for a fraction of a second, that his train has moved
backward. The senses, the mechanisms which translate reality into meaningful
perceptions and thus allow the individual to interact with the outside world,
provide raw data, thus fulfilling a role similar to the one moral intuitions play
in the formulation of principles ofjustice. In a feedback loop, the brain adjusts
what it perceives to be happening based on what it knows must be happening,
i.e., "its model of reality." Thus, the brain's first response when it senses an
object outside the train window to be moving forward is that its container must
be moving backwards." Similarly, if one sees something extraordinary,
something that contradicts what the brain expects, one usually dismisses the
observation. For example, if a lone individual sees a mysterious object at night,
he is likely to blink and look again or check his eyeglasses rather than
concluding that he has seen a UFO or a heavenly apparition. He may even
dismiss the observation unless it occurs again, is reinforced by others, or finds
some support in his own predisposition to believe in flying saucers.
Man's approach to the moral realm closely resembles his interpretation of
physical reality; both involve feedback processes which fit data, intuitions or
senses, to previously held principles, the brain's "model of reality" or moral
principles. Though principles are based on raw data, man is likely to dismiss
any data that do not coincide with these principles. However, an accumulation
of data that is inconsistent with his principles forces him to reevaluate his
principles in favor of the data. Eventually, the passenger realizes his train is not
moving and, perhaps, even that heavenly apparitions or other seemingly irrational
objects exist. The brain, which attempts to fit new data to its incomplete view
of existence until forced to reevaluate its principles, takes time to comprehend
unexpected data. Eventually, the brain will adjust and gain a better approximation of reality; it is the brain, unable to comprehend all of reality, which changes,
and not reality. Experience and trial and error are thus crucial to man's
unfolding appreciation of objective reality and morality, i.e., moving beyond the

35. Lowell Ponte, In the Blink of an Ear,Reader's Dig., October 1993 at 109-13.
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superficial to understand the underlying principles which order the moral and
physical worlds.36
The ability to override principles in favor of individual intuitions is an
important one, even if it is never used. The fact that principles are contingent
upon intuitions suggests that there is some point at which any principle could be
abandoned. Take the case of a man who believes in his denomination dependent
on something else, be it a belief in revelation, church authority, sensual
perceptions, or experience. If it were possible to show that these underlying
revelations, senses, etc. were no longer valid, then the belief in the denomination
would no longer hold. For example, suppose that it could be proven that a
particular sect's scriptures were hoaxes authored by swindlers; surely, its
membership would decline. Any reasonable person has considered what new
data would cause him to abandon his current beliefs; only the fanatic insists,
beyond all reason and with absolute certainty, that his belief is irrefutable, true
regardless of future experiences, new knowledge, etc. Indeed, it is this
dependence of principles on intuitions for justification that allows for the
possibility of conversions.
The contingency of moral principles does not mean that all individuals
consciously recognize why they believe what they believe, nor does it deny that
certain individuals have very firm faiths, e.g., one with a belief in God stronger
than belief in self or reason. However, all beliefs, including religious faiths
adopted due to will, reason, or experience, ultimately depend on intuitions. Even
the individual who suspends reason and wills himself to believe in God, i.e.,
takes the Kantian leap of faith, depends upon an intuitive belief in free will and
chooses God due to intuitive data: reason itself is only reasonable because of
human intuitions that the world is an ordered and understandable environment;
experience is trustworthy only because intuition leads one to trust one's senses;
etc.
The underlying reason to believe in intuitions is intuitive; their validity is
contained within the intuitions themselves. By definition, intuitions are direct
insights into truth which are not dependent on reason or any other justification.
Like first principles, intuitions cannot be questioned or derived; they simply are.
It makes no sense to subject the validity of intuitions as a whole to the secondary
objects derived from intuitions, but it does make sense to use primary intuitions
and their derivatives, e.g., cause no pain, reason, etc., to discern which insights
are truly intuitions.
Though intuitions play a crucial role in informing individuals of the
obligations of morality, thus justifying general principles, they are merely
insights into, and not creators of, an objective reality.3" The challenge then is
to formulate a theory that respects individual preferences, informed by intuitions,

36. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 428-42, 682-703 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1985); see also Plato,
supranote 2, at 165-215.
37. Pope John Paul II, supra note 23, at 92.
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without becoming overly dependent on those preferences. If moral principles are
to mean anything, they must occasionally possess veto power over individual
preferences. Societymust sometimes, though very cautiously and rarely, override
an individual's stated interests to advance his actual interests or to protect
another's fundamental rights.
Intuitionism's dependence on intuitions for acceptance, but not the ultimate
existence, of moral principles means that a society's collective preferences are
impotent to change moral truths. A helpful analogy is the familiar cartoon
character that runs off a cliff and seemingly continues running until he suddenly
stops in midair and ponders his situation. Upon realizing what he has done, the
character plummets to the ground. In reality, the character's realization has no
more to do with his falling than an individual's appreciation of moral intuitions
causes the principles ofjustice. The force of gravity and the principles ofjustice
both exist independent of the cartoon's realization or the individual's intuitions;
the latter merely allow the actors to understand the laws governing their actions.
Just as the theories of nuclear physics did not become any more real upon
their discovery, a relatively recent event, nor are they any less real or binding in
countries with high rates of illiteracy or undeveloped science programs, moral
concepts exist at least partly independent of man. As the tree falling in an
isolated forest makes a noise even if no one hears it, moral principles are
similarly independent of man; only the effects, e.g., vibrating eardrums and
intuitions, and not the phenomena themselves, require people. Thus, man's
intuitions serve as partial reflections of objective moral imperatives and
play a crucial role in allowing him to discern these principles, but have
no causal role.
Man's intuitions testify to the existence and power of objective moral
concepts, but their coincidence with moral truths does not suggest a causal
relationship. Intuitionism does not devolve into relativism, which claims to
allow man to create truth, but rather uses intuitions to construct general
principles that serve as man's approximations of truth. Thus, reason,
combined with moral intuitions, provides more than logical consistency or
mere calculation, i.e., rises above the emaciated nominalist conception
adopted by Ockham, and helps man understand part of reality. Though
man is apt to misuse reason, it is a powerful tool when properly applied;
together, reason and intuitions allow man the opportunity to achieve moral
wisdom. Man's fundamental intuitions, e.g., reason, lead him to trust
particular authorities or general principles over his subsequent intuitions
until the intuitions being overridden are too many in number or too great
in significance to be ignored. This feedback process allows man to use
intuitions, despite his inability to discern them fully, to gain a better
understanding of moral truths.
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INTUITIONISM AND KANTIAN MORALITY

35

Intuitionism's moral principles are binding on all rational beings; therefore,
the moral law is both objective and prescriptive. The objective aspect is
necessary ifan individual is to assess the commandments of any authority, rather
than leaving the individual at the mercy of an arbitrary authority. Furthermore,
the universality of the law allows an individual to judge actions in other time
periods, e.g., slavery, and in other cultures, e.g., female circumcision. The
prescriptive nature means that to recognize the moral law, not necessarily an
obvious exercise, is to be motivated by it, though not necessarily to act
upon it. Weak will, competing appetites, etc. may prevent the moral law
from being actualized. Other entities with the same objective and prescriptive nature include inductive inference, laws of logic, scientific explanation,
etc.
Two objections are commonly raised against an objective view ofmorality.
The first is that morality, like rationality, is not brought to human experience, but
rather learned. Pavlov, Skinner, and other noted academics have illustrated the
incidence of conditioned behavior in a variety of species. Just as primates may
learn to communicate via hand signals, perhaps humans also learn the rules of
logic and morality. For example, a baby learns that crying attracts attention and
results in feeding; thus, he internalizes the logic behind causal relationships.
Rationality and morality may be contingent on human experience. Proponents
of such criticisms do not usually provide a credible alternative to current rules
of logic or morality as frameworks for society, but insist that the fact of
historical contingency is the only true universal.
Kant rejects the notion that humans are biologically or socially programmed
and merely act in accordance with the moral law rather than being motivated by
and aware of it. In response to the sociobiologist who claims that natural
selection preserves genes for limited altruism, e.g., an adult zebra will sacrifice
itself to a predator so that the young survive, Kant claims that humans are
capable of universal altruism extending beyond one's immediate genetic group.
Morality must enter one's causality for acting in a particular way, denoting
awareness, in the same way that laws of theoretical reasoning, i.e., induction and
deduction, must enter an individual's deliberation process rather than being mere
human habits. Kant rejects the naturalist account of programmed humans since
accepting such a theory depends on the very laws of theoretical inference it
denies.39 Freedom is necessary for reason to function, e.g., to conclude whether
humans are programmed or autonomous, else man's thoughts would be the result
of an external factor. Intuitionism agrees with Kant's claim that man has an

38. 1am indebted to Dr. Ralph Walker, of Magdalen College, for discussing with me many of
the concepts which follow both through lectures and personal conversations.

39. Imnmanuel Kant, Groundworkofthe Metaphysic ofMorals 99-100,105-10,120-21 (HJ. Paton
trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964).
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innate moral capacity, i.e., intuitions, but also allows man to develop this
capacity through experience.
A second criticism argues that while Kant may show why rationality, and
perhaps morality, is non-empirical, he does not show it to be a priori to the
human experience. McDowell suggests that the existence of values attached to
objects testifies to nothing more than their tendency to produce a reaction in
humans. Values are thus dependent on humans for their existence; for example,
the color blue only exists insofar as humans perceive it and would cease to exist
if no humans existed."' He argues that even if rationality is the inevitable
content-neutral process of thought, it is entirely dependent on humans. In
contrast, Kant maintains that laws of theoretical inference and morality and other
objective laws are not mere human habits, but rather exist independently. He
claims that the universality of morality means it cannot come from self-love or
sympathy, i.e., human reactions, since feelings are particular, but morality is
general. Indeed, he goes so far as to say even God's exclamations that various
aspects of creation are good can be but descriptive, not causal, statements. 41
Kant therefore maintains the laws of morality and logic exist independent of
God, else God would be free to act arbitrarily and man would have no criteria
by which to assess revelation.
Though Kant talks ofthe consequencesofthe objective nature ofmorality and
logic, e.g., establishing criteria by which to assess God's revelation and man's
experience, he is not claiming that they prove objectivity. Kant realizes that any
consequentialistargumenteventuallycollapsesinto some firstprinciple andinstead
argues from a descriptive view. He accepts the objective nature of both morality
and rationality without offering consequentialist arguments. For example, he
rejects adopting the laws of logic as being "truth-preserving," traveling between
Truth A and B, and induction as "truth-maximizing," going from truths in the past
to those in the future. Kant accepts the laws of logic and induction as categorical
imperatives, i.e., independently valid. While the alternative consequentialist
argument leads to the questions of why the goal of truth is worth pursuing and
how strict the obligation to reasoning must be, Kant asserts that there is a prior
obligation to be logical and use reason before one's commitment to truth. Thus,
even if most actual inductions are wrong, the process of induction is still a
rational, and therefore valid, method. For example, an Oxford fresher may induce
that it will rain on the 200th day after it has rained 199 prior days, but the 200th
day may be clear. Kant argues such mistaken, but justifiable, inductions are the
proper way to reason. He therefore maintains rationality is an objective law, but
is not necessarily a statement about fact.
Kant argues the moral law is similar to the laws of inferences, accepted as
rules and not merely contingent premises, in that it must be accepted a priori of

40. John McDowell, Values andSecondary Qualities,in Morality and Objectivity 111-14 (Ted
Honderich ed., 1985).
41. Genesis 1:1-31.
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one's experience and also exists independent of rational beings. Thus, it is
possible to be mistaken about the content, but not the nature, of moral law.
Inter-societal differences are often less thanwhat they appear and can be merely
attempts to apply what is right in different circumstances.
Intuitionism is sympathetic to Kant's claims for an independent objective
morality, but rejects his argument that a rationalist morality is any less arbitrary
than relying on divine will. Kant must, ultimately, admit that the justification
of any moral law without referenceto an external source is impossible; morality
cannot be judged more than internally consistent without an external reference
point. This lack of certainty should not be troubling, however, as humans
commonly trust without requiring absolute justification. Absolute skepticism
about objective laws can never be refuted, but also cannot be accepted. To think,
argue, and understand oneself as a person means that one cannot take such
skepticism seriously. Ultimately, all beliefs depend on self-evident, selfjustifying intuitions. Humanity's subjective experiences, i.e., individually held
intuitions, converge to inform man of objective principles.

XI. OBJECTrVE TRUTH OF MORALITY
The moral law, which gives intuitions their content, is objectively true and
has independent value. Though morality coincides with human nature, meaning
moral principles promote human well-being, the lack of a causal relationship
prevents intuitionism from being consequentialist. The dictates ofthe moral law
are to be followed as categorical imperatives, not dependent on achieving an
independent goal. Yet, the coincidence of morality and human well-being
provides an alternative teleological approach to discerning moral obligations.
Thus, intuitionism combines the categorical imperative's abstraction from the
particulars of a situation with the consequentialist link between morality and
human well-being.
Though the moral law may be discerned through intuitions and promotes
human well-being, its legitimacy is not contingent on its acceptance or its
consequences. Actions have intrinsic moral properties independent of their
consequences, e.g., pleasure produced.42 Suppose two men are guarding
unmarked packages with identical external features and are unaware of their
contents. If both packages are lost, the value of each package would be
immaterial in assessing blame. The obligation for each man is to protect the
package and the moral responsibility, distinct from the legal liability, is the same
regardless if the package contains feathers or fifty-dollar bills. It is wrong to
assess the morality of man's actions according to the outcome of fate, i.e.,
consequences.
The fact that moral principles are categorical imperatives does not prevent
prima facie moral duties from being overridden by other binding moral duties.

42. Philippa Foot, Morality asa System ofHypotheticalimperatives,81 Phil. Rev. 305-16 (1972).
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Though particular actions cannot change from being right to wrong or wrong to

right, 3 actors may bear little or no responsibility for performing wrong actions.
Unlike goal-dependentduties, categoricalimperatives allow an agent's motivation
to affect his culpability. Take the case of terrorists who threaten to kill a man's
family unless he attacks an innocent victim. Though the resulting attack is
objectively evil, the person wielding the weapon bears diminished moral
responsibility since he is acting under duress, rather than with true free
will. Intentionality is thus one factor that may alter an actor's personal
responsibility, but not the action's inherent moral status. Thus, the application,
but not intrinsic value, of moral duties may be dependent on specific circumstances.
Particular factors such as intentionality can be considered without compromising objective moral principles, i.e., causing the same action to be simultaneously right and wrong. Such reasoning is similar, though not necessarily
identical, to the "double effect" argument that allows a pro-life physician to
remove a fallopian tube containing a fetus in the case of an ectopic pregnancy.
Removing the tube is a medical procedure, rarely performed, which incidentally
leads to the abortion of the fetus, but removing the fetus alone is an intentional
abortion. Though the fetus is removed in either procedure, many "double effect"
proponents argue that the intentionality differs in a meaningful way.45
Fulfilling the requirement of one moral principle may incidentally involve
violating another, but the primary intention must not be to commit a wrong.
Thus, the imperative to save life does not override the imperative not to harm
innocent life; an individual is not allowed to kill or harm one man to provide
spare organs for several patients. 46 In contrast, consider the case of a homeowner who takes the life of a hostile intruder; the homeowner is right to defend
his life and bears no moral responsibility for the act ofkilling. Though the death
of an individual is the result of both the intruder and the organ transplant cases,
the action in the first case is defending one's life and the incidental effect is the
death of the intruder; the action in the second case is taking innocent life and the
effect is the saving of several lives. Regardless of the positive consequences,
evil actions are never justified.
Even though moral principles are presented as categorical imperatives, their
coincidence with human well-being allows justifications usually reserved for
hypothetical imperatives. Principles of justice should fit the human condition
and thus result in positive consequences that can be used to convince the skeptic.
Though the moral law is both non-empirical and a priori, i.e., not based on
natural data and necessary as a pre-condition to evaluate experience, it is

43. George Edward Moore, Ethics 79-84 (1912).
44. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good 22-39 (1950).
45. Thomas Bokenkotter, Essential Catholicism: Dynamics of Faith and Belief 316-22 (1986);
see also, David F. Kelly, The Emergence of Roman Catholic Medical Ethics in North America 24758 (1979).
46. Eric Mack, Sighting Rights, 103 Ethics 779, 789 (1993).
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supported by the circumstantial evidence of facilitating human flourishing and
coinciding with intuitions.

Though principles of justice may be defended on consequentialist grounds
to appease the skeptic, this should not be interpreted as a concession to his
claims concerning truth. It is often necessary to advance principles on grounds
other than those that caused one to accept them to find common ground with
others; this does not invalidate one's original reasons or cause one to reject one's
principles if the reasons advanced in argument are refuted. For example, the
Catholic Church argues that verifiable psychological suffering, emotional trauma,
and perhaps even biological disease which result from disobeying its sexual
ethics are proof for the secular world that monogamous relationships are natural;
however, Catholics believe in chastity and condemn adultery on religious, and

not consequentialist, grounds. Christian sexual ethics are not contingent upon
their coincidence with human nature, but rather on divine revelation. Though
man's experience may inform him of moral principles governing sexual activity,
regardless ofreligious affiliation, the Church maintains an independent reason for
its teachings. Similarly, intuitionism's moral concepts are not contingent on their
coincidence with human well-being; their credibility does not ultimately depend
on empirical claims.
Intuitionism's consequentialist justifications do not signify that the moral
code was invented by humanity for expedience. It is not enough to show a
coincidence ofphenomena, e.g., human needs and moral codes, to assert a causal
relation; skeptics must also show that man's need for an ordered universe
preceded the existence of moral codes if they are to assert that needs created
morality, and not vice versa. The assertion that morality only exists if it is
perceived by the subject is surely not how one approaches the world; man
routinely believes in many things he cannot see or fully understand. Just as the
existence of DNA is not dependent on whether the reader is convinced of its
reality, the moral law exists independent of man's appreciation.
XII. CONCLUSION
Though intuitionism's insights into objective morality are not infallible,

intuitionism provides a stronger justification for binding obligations on members
of society than relativistic arguments. In addition to applying the moral force
necessary to require individuals to sacrifice their self-interests in a just society,
intuitionism coincides better with human experience.
First, intuitionism resolves the "open question" argument by allowing an
action to coincide with its definition of good and yet still be judged to be bad.
The paradox arises when certain actions satisfy the literal definition of good and
are yet still seemingly bad or at least questionable. Yet, the subjectivist's
definition of good as that which one desires does not allow such questioning or

LOUISLINA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 59

moral doubt.47 This dilemma is the situation described when one's intuitions
conflict with general principles. Though intuitionism does not require any
human sanction to give morality its ontological reality, it claims that intuitions
inform the individual of moral principles and thus give morality its subjective
motivational force. In the rare case when one's intuitions continuously conflict
with a principle, actions deemed morally acceptable may turn out to be wrong
or vice versa.
Second, intuitionism allows the possibility of a mistake in moral judgement.
In contrast, subjectivism's resolution of moral dilemmas based on feelings allows
no room for errors. Intuitionism admits and even predicts that all individuals
will have flawed intuitions. Man's inability to discern fully his intuitions, or
even consistently differentiate them from competing appetites, makes it possible
and even likely that he will be mistaken over moral judgements. A basic tenet
of intuitionism is that the individual cannot trust his every intuition; only basic
intuitions, authorities derived from intuitions, intuitions commonly acceptedby
all people over all time, and conclusions derived from these fundamentals using
reason can be trusted.
Third, intuitionism allows a difference of opinion. Subjectivists seem to be
arguing over feelings that should be personal and thus cannot be correct or
mistaken." The same argument that threatens subjectivism provides support for
intuitionism. Rather than invalidating objective morality, disagreement serves the
role of helping society discern truth; man's knowledge of moral principles
evolves with time and experience. Arguments over the morality of a particular
act may involve individuals motivated by differing intuitions or conflicting
appetites. The intuitions that emerge from such disagreements intact are that
much more credible; as consensus is built, society has a more precise knowledge
of which intuitions and principles to respect.
Intuitionism provides an objective justification for political morality that
incorporates individual beliefs. Though this paper does not detail a higher
authority underlying intuitions, it does show how subjective insights can provide
information about an objective morality. The intuitionist strategy is to appeal to
convictions previously held by the reader, intuitions he believes to be universally
true, and then to construct principles ofjustice. The reader's intuitions provide
the criteria by which principles of justice are justified.

47. George Edward Moore, Principa Ethica 15-17 (1951).
48. Moore, supra note 43, at 99-106.

